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safeguards of suspects and defendants in criminal 




Since the concept of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ was introduced in 1997 
with the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union (EU) has added a new dimension to 
the traditional police and judicial cooperation between its member states. In the main 
EU policy documents aimed to elaborate this ambitious goal, European policy makers 
have always stressed the importance of a well-balanced agenda taking into account 
the core principles which lay at the foundation of the EU itself. In the conclusions of 
the Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October 1999, the following principles 
– which have been reiterated in subsequent policy documents in this area ever since 
– were expressed:
“From its very beginning European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared 
commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule 
of law. These common values have proved necessary for securing peace and develop-
ing prosperity in the European Union. They will also serve as a cornerstone for the 
enlarging Union.
”People have the right to expect the Union to address the threat to their freedom and 
legal rights posed by serious crime. To counter these threats a common effort is needed 
to prevent and fight crime and criminal organisations throughout the Union. The 
joint mobilisation of police and judicial resources is needed to guarantee that there is 
no hiding place for criminals or the proceeds of crime within the Union.”
In other words, according to Europe’s leaders, in building the ‘area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice’, crime-fighting and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
should go hand in hand.
Within this context, European criminal (procedural) law has developed with the 
central goal of improving cooperation, both at the supranational as the inter-state level. 
Important achievements have indeed been made since the Tampere Council. The 
European arrest warrant being probably the best example of the direction in which 
the EU wants to proceed. The main characteristic of this innovative instrument (the 
adoption of which was highly influenced by the post ‘9/11’ trauma) is the principle 
of mutual recognition. This principle, in a broad sense meaning the recognition of 
foreign decisions without prior conditions and with immediate effect in the requested 
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state, has taken judicial cooperation in criminal matters to a new level. However, the 
practical implementation of the mutual recognition principle may be detrimental to 
fundamental rights. The most striking example is the formal removal of the non-
discrimination rule from extradition/surrender law in the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW) framework.1
A critical observer of EU policy in the field of criminal law, cannot deny that the prac-
tice of EU-policy making (in the implementation of the Tampere Programme, particu-
larly since September 2001) and the main emphasis of the Action Plan implementing 
the Hague Programme are mainly repressive and prosecution-oriented.2 The idea of 
introducing a set of common (minimum) rules, guaranteeing the rights of defence 
at a EU-wide level, has not been accorded the same attention as the introduction of 
instruments aimed at improving the effectiveness of crime-fighting. Although some 
symbolic steps have been taken (such as the signing of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union in December 2000 by the European Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament and the Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on 
certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union, 
submitted by the European Commission on 28 April 2004), the realisation of mini-
mum standards still seems far away.
What does this finding mean for the future of the EU’s criminal policy? Will the EU 
succeed the coming years in developing an area where freedom, security and justice 
are truly balanced? According to several authors, the EU has evolved in the opposite 
direction. As one observer put it: “if Procedural Criminal Law arises from the appli-
cation of Constitutional Law, or indeed if it may be described as ‘a seismograph of 
the constitutional system of a State’, then as a consequence the Procedural Criminal 
Law of the European Union shows the extent of the Democratic Rule of Law, of the 
existence of a true ‘Rechtsstaat’, within an integrated Europe. This situation may be 
qualified as lamentable, as the main plank of the EU’s criminal justice policy relates 
to the simplification and the speeding up of police and judicial cooperation – articles 
30 and 31 of the Treaty of the EU – but without at the same time setting an acceptable 
standard for fundamental rights throughout a united Europe.”3
Against this background, the current article aims to explore some of the options avail-
able to the EU in proceeding with its work in this field. Three aspects constitute the 
main framework. Firstly, a description of the work the EU has done so far in relation 
to procedural rights in criminal proceedings. Depending on this ‘status questionis’, a 
1 The remaining paragraph in the preamble, stating that the framework decision respects the funda-
mental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 
and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Chapter VI) and that nothing in the framework decision 
may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for whom a EAW has been issued when 
objective elements exist for believing that the EAW is issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punish-
ing a person on account of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion or 
sexual orientation, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons, is de iure 
insufficient to rule out that persons will be subjected to discriminatory prosecution in one of the mem-
ber states.
2 See, inter alia, M. Anderson, Law enforcement cooperation in the EU and fundamental rights protec-
tion, in M. Martin (ed.), Crime, rights and the EU: the future of police and judicial cooperation, JUS-
TICE, 2008, 105-120; E. Cape, J. Hodgson, T. Prakken and T. Spronken (eds.), Suspects in Europe, 
procedural rights at the investigative stage of the criminal process in the European Union, Intersentia, 
2007, 2-3. 
3 K. Ambos, Mutual recognition versus procedural guarantees?, in M. de Hoyos Sancho (ed.), Criminal 
proceedings in the European Union: essential safeguards, Lex Nova, Valladolid, 2008, 25. 
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positive answer to the question whether there is a real need for EU action in this field 
is a prerequisite in order to proceed to the final aspect, comprising an in-depth analy-
sis of the ideal (legal) mechanism(s) to achieve the two core objectives in this area: (1) 
improving judicial (and police) cooperation and (2) providing suspects and defendants 
within the EU with a procedural protection adequate to counterbalance the rapidly 
expanding spectrum of investigation/prosecution-oriented instruments.
2 Criminal procedure within the EU: status questionis
2.1 Introduction
The current basic framework of the EU regarding procedural rights in criminal pro-
ceedings consists of article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Both documents explicitly refer to the acquis of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) of the Council of Europe.
Article 6 TEU provides that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guar-
anteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
Member States.
In December 2000, The European Commission, The Council and the Parliament 
jointly signed and solemnly proclaimed the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.4 The Charter includes several rights applicable to criminal proceed-
ings such as the ‘right to an effective remedy and a fair trial’ (article 47) and ‘the 
presumption of innocence and right of defence’ (article 48). Moreover, article 53 states 
that “in so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed 
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection.” Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter now is a 
legally binding text.5
In order to better understand the background of the developments the past five 
years at EU level in regard of procedural guarantees, two basis concepts should first 
be explained, both lying at the core of the EU’s efforts to enhance cooperation between 
competent authorities in criminal cases: (1) approximation and (2) mutual recogni-
tion.
2.2 Approximation of criminal procedure vs. mutual recognition
For decades, differences between national laws and legal cultures have been a breed-
ing ground for distrust and have resulted in a reluctance to cooperate and delays to 
investigations. Taking away these differences, often referred to as harmonisation of 
4 OJ., 18 December 2000, C.346/1
5 Declarations annexed to the final act of the intergovernmental conference which adopted the Treaty of 
Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 (OJ., 9 May 2008, C.115/337). 
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criminal law and procedure although approximation is a more accurate term, is one 
way of getting round such difficulties.6
This strategy, however, is inclined to run up against the hurdle of subsidiarity in the 
field of justice and home affairs, states not being much inclined to regard their own 
laws and policies as being in need of adaptation.7 Therefore, a more subtle mechanism 
has been developed.
The concept of mutual recognition of judicial decisions has been known, since the 
European Council of Tampere in 1999,8 as the future ‘cornerstone’ of judicial coopera-
tion in – civil as well as – criminal matters and has in that context fulfilled the role of 
catalyst in the development of harmonisation of the criminal law of the EU member 
states. It implies that while another state may not deal with a certain matter in the 
same or even a similar way as one’s own state, the results are accepted as equivalent 
to decisions of one’s own state.
Finding its practical rendering in a well-structured 24-measure programme,9 the 
realisation of the concept has featured high on the EU’s justice and home affairs 
agenda during the past six years. Aimed at the elimination of all exequatur procedures 
applicable between the EU member states, the mutual recognition principle requires 
mutual trust between these states in the sense that they feel confident relying on each 
other’s decisions in criminal matters and executing them without further require-
ments or conformity control vis-à-vis their own substantive and procedural criminal 
law standards.10 So far, several steps have been taken to accomplish mutual recogni-
tion of certain decisions in criminal matters.11
6 Ch. Brants, Procedural safeguards in the European Union: too little, too late?, in J. Vervaele (ed.), Eu-
ropean evidence warrant: transnational judicial enquiries in the EU, Intersentia, 2005, 105. 
7 Ibid. 
8 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999. 
9 Council of the EU, Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judi-
cial decisions in criminal matters, OJ C 12, of 15.1.2001. 
10 For this analysis, see earlier: G. Vermeulen, ‘Mutual recognition, harmonisation and fundamental 
(procedural) rights protection’, in M. Martin (ed.), Crime, rights and the EU: the future of police and 
judicial cooperation, JUSTICE, 2008, 89-104. 
11 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender proce-
dures between Member States, OJ L 190/1 of 18.7.2002; Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA 
of 22 July 2003 on the execution in the European Union of orders freezing property or evidence, OJ L 
196 of 2.8.2003; Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the application 
of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, OJ L 76 of 22.3.2005; Council Framework 
Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
to confiscation orders, OJ L 328 of 24.11.2006; Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA of 24 July 
2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States of the European Union in the course of 
new criminal proceedings, OJ L 220 of 15.8.2008; Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 
November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal 
matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose 
of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ L 327 of 5.12.2008; Council Framework Decision 
2008/947/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judg-
ments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative 
sanctions, OJ L 337, 16.12.2008; Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on 
the European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters, OJ L 350 of 31.12.2008.
 In addition the Commission produced a green paper on the principle of mutual recognition: Commu-
nication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the mutual recogni-
tion of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the strengthening of mutual trust between Member 
States, COM (2005) 195, 19 May 2005.
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2.3 The link between mutual recognition and procedural safeguards
The principle of mutual recognition has been known and applied in the context of 
Europe’s internal market for decades (by establishing free movement of goods and 
mutually recognising product standards).12 Transferring this principle to the setting 
of criminal proceedings is not a simple matter though. The free movement of goods 
cannot be compared to the free movement of evidence or data13 in the context of a 
criminal prosecution. This is not only due to the fact that evidence or data to be used 
in criminal proceedings cannot be extracted or ‘exported’ as a ‘final product’ from the 
general context of its legal order, with its respective particularities relating to the way 
it is gathered, without bringing about changes or loss of probative value.14 At least as 
crucial is the fact that the personal freedoms of the EU’s citizens are at stake in this 
field. This requires a specific approach.
The Tampere version of the mutual recognition principle was something of a 
novum, in that it requires the recognition and execution of judicial decisions from 
other member states without a national, judicial test of their lawfulness or legitimacy.15 
The logical implication of this is mutual recognition a priori that the foreign process 
in question meets all of the requirements that flow from the rule of law, as understood 
by the executing state. It is a logical conclusion therefore that, given the sensitivities 
surrounding sovereignty and feelings of superiority with regard to one’s own national 
criminal procedures, mutual recognition in the field of judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters is only feasible if all states can rely on decisions taken abroad meeting at 
least the minimum safeguards that their own procedures provide.16
2.4 Towards approximation of procedural rights of suspects and defendants: the 
proposal for a framework decision
The Commission stated in 2000 in a Communication to the Council and the European 
Parliament that “it must therefore be ensured that the treatment of suspects and the 
rights of the defence would not only suffer from the implementation of the princi-
ple (of mutual recognition) but that the safeguards would even be improved through 
the process”.17 This was endorsed in the Programme of Measures to implement the 
Principle of Mutual Recognition of Decisions in Criminal Matters, adopted by the 
Council and the Commission. It pointed out that “mutual recognition is very much 
dependent on a number of parameters which determine its effectiveness” and that 
these parameters include “mechanisms for safeguarding the rights of […] suspects” 
(parameter 3) and “the definition of common minimum standards necessary to facili-
tate the application of the principle of mutual recognition” (parameter 4).18
This conviction led to the drafting by the Commission in 2004 of a ‘Proposal for 
a Council Framework Decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings 
12 ECJ, 20 February 1979 (case 120/78). 
13 Through the so-called principle of availability, cf. supra.
14 K. Ambos, l.c., 31. 
15 Ch. Brants, l.c., 106
16 Ibid.. 
17 Communcation to the Council and the European Parliament of 26 July 2000 on Mutual Recognition of 
Final Decisions in Criminal Matters (COM(2000) 495 final, 29.7.2000).
18 OJ, 15 January 2001, C.12, p. 10. 
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throughout the European Union’.19 Emerging from the consultation process preceding 
the drafting of this proposal were five areas of priority rights: legal aid for suspects and 
defendants; the development of a ‘letter of rights’ to inform suspects which rights they 
could exercise; extra protection for ‘vulnerable groups’; consular assistance; and trans-
lators and interpreters. Other subjects (such as bail, the principles of nemo tenetur 
and ne bis in idem, fairness in the handling of evidence, appeal and trial in absentia) 
were reserved for ‘further research’.
As negotiations developed, increasing opposition to the proposal emerged. 
Probably the main dividing line was the question whether the EU was competent to 
legislate on purely domestic proceedings or whether the legislation should be devoted 
only to cross-border cases.20 It is striking to note in this respect that this element did 
not prevent member states to adopt a wide range of measures in the fight against 
crime, which also have direct implications for domestic law and domestic proceed-
ings (e.g. common definitions on terrorist offences21 or minimum standards on maxi-
mum sentences for certain types of trafficking in persons22). Nor was it an obstacle in 
2001 for improving the standing of victims in criminal proceedings.23 In this context 
reference should also be made to article 82 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU).24 According to this article, directives establishing minimum 
rules should aim at facilitating mutual recognition of judgments and judicial deci-
sions, and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. These minimum rules 
should concern, inter alia, mutual admissibility of evidence between member states, 
the rights of individuals in criminal procedure and the rights of victims of crime. This 
competence of the EU is new, in the sense that criminal procedure had so far been left 
out of the scope of harmonisation (cf. the wordings of article 31 TEU). Another com-
mon critique to the proposed framework decision was that the rights were too vague 
and set at too low a threshold or that the proposal would have added little value to the 
existing protections under the ECHR.
Eventually, no political agreement could be reached.25 The Commission however 
remained convinced of the need for EU action on this point. A Study carried out for 
the Commission by the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) between 2007 and 2009 
showed that almost all practitioners involved in cross-border proceedings consider an 
instrument of this sort to be essential.26 Moreover, the Commission ordered a study 
19 COM(2004) 328 final. 
20 Press release on the 2807th Session of the Council on the 12th and 13th of June 2007. 
21 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164/3, 22.6.2002. 
22 Council Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ L 203/1, 
1.8.2002. 
23 Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, OJ 
L 82/1, 22.03.2001. 
24 OJ. 9 May 2008, C 115, 47. With the entrance into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the existing Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community will be renamed as Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). Together with the new Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the TFEU constitutes the 
new foundation of the EU (see for a detailed explanation and for the status of ratifications: http://eu-
ropa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm 
25 Even on a diluted version, Justice Ministers could not find any agreement at the Justice and Home Af-
fairs Council on 19 to 20 April 2007. The proposal was discussed again by the Council on 13 June 2007. 
The Council was unable to agree and there the matter has lain since. 
26 G. Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and L. Surano, Institute for European Studies, Université Libre de Brux-
elles ECLAN – European Criminal Law Academic Network, Analysis of the Future of Mutual Recogni-
tion in Criminal Matters in the European Union, 20th November 2008, EC DG JLS. 
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to be carried out in order to obtain up to date information on this subject that could 
provide a basis for a new proposal for a council framework decision.27
Finally, on 8 July 2009 the European Commission presented a new and much more 
limited draft for a Council Framework Decision on procedural rights.28 Unlike the pre-
vious proposal, this new draft only focuses on one set of rights, namely those relating 
to interpretation and translation.
3 Is there need for EU action in the field of procedural rights in criminal 
proceedings?
3.1 Introduction
Given the difficulties already encountered in the negotiation of the 2004 Proposal and 
taking account of the possible overlap with the ECHR, as stated by several member 
states, it is useful to reflect on the need for a EU instrument on procedural rights. 
Could it not suffice to refer to the ECHR as the main mechanism for preserving fun-
damental rights in Europe? Could the EU bring added value and, if so, in what way? 
And does the mutual recognition doctrine not imply a basic level of trust between 
EU’s member states?
The current chapter will show that the answer to each of these questions all comes 
down to the same fundamental conclusion: there is an urgent need for an in-depth EU 
legal initiative on procedural rights, not only to safeguard subjects involved in crimi-
nal proceedings throughout the EU but also to ensure the effectiveness of judicial and 
police cooperation as such.
3.2 The (in)adequacy of the ECHR framework
A first question is whether the ECHR framework does not offer sufficient protection 
to suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings. Doubts about whether the ECHR 
and the European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) are able to offer this kind of 
protection, are not ill-founded. The ECHR is implemented to very differing standards 
in the member states and there are many violations. The number of applications is 
growing every year and the ECtHR is seriously overloaded (there are currently 110,000 
cases outstanding at the ECtHR and articles 5 and 6 of the Convention are the most 
commonly cited in applications). Moreover, member states have not always amended 
their legislation to adapt them to the condemnatory judgements of the ECtHR which 
– in essence – are not of an enforceable nature.
Further, the ECHR jurisprudence does not contain any explicit imperative on the 
rules of evidence.29 The admissibility of evidence is primarily governed by the rules 
27 The ‘Study on Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings: existing levels of safeguards in the Euro-
pean Union – 2008 update is carried out by the University of Maastricht (Prof. Taru Sponken) and by 
the Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy of Ghent University (Prof. Gert Vermeu-
len). The study is a revision and update of an earlier study performed by Taru Spronken and Marelle 
Attinger of Maastricht University, published in December 2005. 
28 COM (2009) 338. 
29 S. Gless, Mutual recognition, judicial inquiries, due process and fundamental rights, in J. Vervaele 
(ed.), o.c., 124. 
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of domestic law, provided that they respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the Convention. It often remains difficult to conclude from the ECHR’s decisions 
whether or to what extent the use of illegally or unfairly obtained evidence constitutes 
a violation.
Besides the apparent need to complement or reinforce the protection offered by the 
ECHR mechanism, a reflection on the need for initiatives on procedural rights at EU 
level should also include some of the latest developments in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU, in particular in the area of 
evidence gathering and transferral.
3.3 Towards a free movement of evidence: what with procedural rights?
The main aspect in this respect concerns the recent adoption of the Council Framework 
Decision on the European Evidence warrant (EEW).30 It has the aim of simplifying and 
accelerating the gathering and transfer of evidence in criminal proceedings with a 
cross-border element. It is mainly intended to replace the 19th century mutual assist-
ance approach with a modern procedure.31
The Framework Decision applies to objects, documents or data obtained under 
various procedural powers, including seizure, production or searches. The EEW can 
however not be used to interview suspects, take statements or hear witnesses and 
victims.32 It can also not be used for investigative measures which involve obtaining 
evidence in real-time such as interception of telecommunication and monitoring of 
bank accounts.33 Nor can it be used to obtain evidence that can only result from further 
investigation or analysis (e.g. to require the commissioning of an expert’s report or to 
require the executing authority to undertake computerised comparison of information 
(computer matching) to identify a person). The EEW will thus be used where evidence 
is directly available in the executing state (e.g. extracting information from a register 
of criminal convictions or requesting data on the existence of bank accounts). It is also 
useable for obtaining objects, documents or data falling within the excluded categories 
provided that they had already been gathered prior to the issuing of the warrant (e.g. to 
obtain existing records of intercepted communications, surveillance, interviews with 
suspects, statements from witnesses and DNA test results).34
Although the framework decision on the EEW does not directly address the 
issue of mutual admissibility of evidence, the EEW nevertheless aims to facilitate 
the admissibility of evidence obtained from the territory of another member state. It 
intends to achieve this mainly in two ways, which touch upon the legal position of the 
individual(s) concerned.
Firstly, certain procedural safeguards are included to protect some fundamental 
rights: (1) only judicial authorities may issue such a warrant; (2) several conditions 
must be met before a warrant can be issued (such as certification of its content and 
30 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant 
for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters, 
OJ L 350 of 31.12.2008.
31 Explanatory Memorandum Nos. 38 f., Proposal for a European Evidence Warrant.
32 Article 4, 2° (a).
33 Article 4, 2° (c). 
34 Article 4, 4°. 
GOFS 4.indd   50 15-01-2010   16:24:37
2e proef (c) Maklu
approximaTion and muTual recoGniTion of procedural safeGuards of suspecTs and defendanTs
Maklu 51
translation into one of the official languages of the executing state); and (3) certain 
grounds of refusal may be claimed by the executing state.
Secondly, admissibility should be facilitated by adopting the ‘forum regit actum’ 
principle, introduced in 2000 by article 4 of the EU Convention on mutual legal assist-
ance in criminal matters.35 According to this principle, the requested state must pro-
vide assistance in accordance with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the requesting state to the maximum extent possible. The requested state can only 
refuse to comply with these requirements where this would be contrary to the funda-
mental principles of law of the executing state or where the Convention itself expressly 
states that the execution of requests is governed by the law of the requested State.36
The rationale behind this principle is the idea that a piece of evidence, legally 
obtained in one member state would be admissible as evidence throughout the EU. 
This is probably not a realistic goal, for it requires the existence of a certain minimum 
degree of trust of member states in one another’s criminal justice system. Only when 
the executing member state deems the issuing state’s legal system sufficiently com-
patible with its own ‘fundamental principles of law’, will the execution of evidence 
warrants (and the admissibility of evidence acquired) happen in a smooth and flexible 
way. It is clear that a EU initiative on procedural rights would potentially have a positive 
effect on guaranteeing this necessary confidence of member states in one another.
This is all the more necessary given the current plans of the Commission to ini-
tiate preparatory work on a Framework Decision which would expand the scope of 
application of the Framework Decision on the EEW in order to further replace the 
existing regime of mutual assistance within the EU by the principle of mutual recog-
nition.37 The explanatory memorandum of the EEW leaves no doubt in this respect38: 
“…the European Evidence Warrant is, in the Commission’s view, the first step towards 
a single mutual recognition instrument that would in due course replace all of the 
existing mutual assistance regime. […]. Such a single consolidated instrument would 
within the EU replace mutual legal assistance in the same way that the European 
arrest warrant will replace extradition. The existing mosaic of international and EU 
conventions governing the cross-border gathering of evidence within the EU would 
thus be replaced by a single EU body of law.”
Traditional judicial cooperation in criminal matters will thus eventually be 
replaced by the mutual recognition principle, which should smooth the way for inter-
state assistance and remove superfluous formalities from all methods of cooperation. 
Combined with the continuing shift from the traditional ‘locus regit actum’ rule to the 
‘forum regit actum’ principle, this would imply that the execution of these mutually 
recognised warrants would be increasingly determined by the procedural rules of the 
35 Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of 
the European Union, OJ C 197, 12.7.2000, p. 1. 
36 Article 12. 
37 A preparatory study “The laws of evidence in criminal proceedings throughout the European Union” 
(JLS 2008/E4/006) is currently carried out by the Institute for International Research on Criminal Poli-
cy (IRCP) of Ghent University (Prof. Gert Vermeulen) in cooperation with the University of Maastricht 
(dr. Wilma Dreissen). 
38 COM(2003) 688 final, p. 10. 
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issuing/requesting state. This evolution implies that the EU is a considerable step 
closer towards a genuine free movement of evidence between its member states.39
The link with the respect for procedural safeguards at a minimum level through-
out the EU is evident. The evolution towards a free movement of evidence would be 
detrimental for the legal position of suspects and defendants throughout the EU, if 
no adequate level of procedural protection were to be guaranteed. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of the system (i.e. a smooth execution of the ‘warrants’) would be seri-
ously hindered if the current differences between members in regard of procedural 
rights were to be maintained. The executing member state would have to make a case 
by case comparison between the procedural rules of the issuing member state and its 
own fundamental principles of law.
It cannot be predicted how member state would deal with such an exercise. One 
thing is sure though. A minimum standard of procedural safeguards, taking into 
account the ECHR and case law of ECtHR on the one hand, and the fundamental 
principles of each member state on the other hand, would hugely diminish potential 
obstacles in applying the ‘forum rule’.
3.4 The breakdown of mutual recognition: mutual trust vs. the resurrecting 
dominance of domestic procedures
Certain recent developments indicate that the EU is taking steps back in regard of the 
mutual trust model. It seems that the mutual recognition doctrine is being questioned 
by some member states in a fundamental way.40
The Council of the EU has – on a single but important stance, i.e. in the con-
text of the EEW – broken with its former reasoning founding the separate regime 
for 32 offences not requiring any verification of dual criminality. Article 23(4) of the 
Framework Decision on the EEW leaves room for a declaration by Germany (which 
it has used) to reserve the right to make the execution of an EEW subject to verifica-
tion of dual criminality in cases relating to terrorism, computer-related crime, racism 
and xenophobia, sabotage, racketeering and extortion or swindling, if it is necessary 
to carry out a search or seizure for the execution of the warrant. Such dual criminal-
ity checks will not be performed, however, in cases where the issuing authority has 
officially declared that its definition of one of the stated offences reflects the criteria 
set out in the German declaration, which – unsurprisingly – reflects the constituent 
elements the latter requires for the offence concerned. In other words, the Council has 
agreed to allow Germany to return to the traditional system of dual criminality for at 
39 It should be noted in this respect that there at already legal instruments in place that provide exten-
sive possibilities such as the Convention of 18 December 1997 on mutual assistance and cooperation 
between customs administrations (Napels II Convention), OJ C 24/1, 23.01.1998. This Convention 
– which can be applied between judicial authorities in criminal investigations (article 3) – not only 
provides that “the requested authority shall agree to comply a particular procedure in response to a re-
quest, provided that that procedure is not in conflict with the legal and administrative provisions of the 
requested Member State” (article 9, 6°) but also foresees a far-reaching framework for using informa-
tion in a broad sense (“…findings, certificates, information documents, certified true copies and other 
papers…”) acquired in the requested state as evidence in accordance with national law of the request-
ing state (article 14). 
40 For this analysis, see earlier, G. Vermeulen, ‘Mutual recognition, harmonisation and fundamental 
(procedural) rights protection’, in M. Martin (ed.), Crime, rights and the EU: the future of police and 
judicial cooperation, JUSTICE, 2008, 89-104. 
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least some of the core crime categories featured in the 32-list, such as terrorism, by 
granting it the possibility of opting-out. In allowing the opt-out clause, which itself is 
clearly triggered by the growing distrust of at least one of the member states, the EU 
seems to have taken a retrograde step. The proclaimed mutual trust model, on which 
mutual recognition is based, has been confronted by a new realism. It seems that we 
are close to exhausting the momentum that 9/11 created, which led to the political 
success of the mutual recognition principle.
Further, it seems that, once again, the mutual recognition principle is unexpect-
edly – probably due to its original success – facing manifest reluctance to make it 
the general policy for third pillar cooperation, i.e. including in the sphere of police 
cooperation. The principle of availability,41 which the Hague Programme wanted to be 
applicable as from 2008, to the exchange of information relevant to law enforcement 
(services), does not encompass genuine mutual recognition of law enforcement deci-
sions – as the EU has chosen to introduce it for judicial decisions in criminal matters 
only. On the contrary, mutual recognition is mitigated by a requirement for verifica-
tion of equivalent access by the requesting authority and access by Europol within its 
competence. Here, the rationale is, therefore, distrust instead of blind confidence. 
This method of functioning does not even correspond to the essence of the forum 
regit actum rule. Like the gradual downfall of mutual recognition, illustrated above 
by the German reintroduction of a dual criminality check in the context of the EEW 
negotiations, this is a retrograde step.
Other illustrations of the recent resurrection of practices and concepts that, until 
recently, were perceived as incompatible with the mutual recognition principle, at 
least in its initial interpretation, may be found in the context of mutual recognition of 
custodial sentences and the mutual recognition of previous convictions. In the case of 
deprivation of liberty, member states should – according to the initial interpretation 
given to mutual recognition – have blind confidence in each other’s decisions involv-
ing deprivation of liberty. Consequently, the executing member state should not be 
put in a position in which it should opt for the lex mitior (the ‘mildest applicable’ law) 
principle, as it was traditionally supposed to do under, e.g. the European Convention 
of 28 May 1970, on the international validity of criminal judgments, or the Convention 
of 21 March 1983, on the transfer of sentenced persons. Instead, it should simply take 
account of the sentence or disqualification and execute it without attaching any further 
requirements. In this respect, it suffices to refer to the explanatory memorandum to 
the initial Commission proposal on the EAW. Under Article 4, paragraph 6 of the EAW 
framework decision, it is possible for the executing member state, where surrender is 
sought for the purpose of executing a sentence, to execute the sentence itself instead of 
surrendering the person concerned to the member state issuing the EAW (aut dedere 
aut exequi rule) – which means mutual recognition of the sentence pronounced in 
the issuing member state. The Commission has pointed out that, in such a case, the 
executing member state would not be allowed to adapt the sanction imposed to bring 
it in line with its domestic law. The text of the memorandum is crystal clear:
41 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the exchange of information 
under the principle of availability, COM (2005) 490 final.
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“Where this Article is applied, the amount of the penalty cannot be amended, even if 
it is different from what would have been ordered in the executing State. The text does 
not take over Article 10 (2) of the 1983 Convention, the implementation of which is 
basically incompatible with the principle of mutual recognition. The executing State’s 
system of execution of sentences will apply.”42
Contrary to the initial Commission standpoint (i.e., in designing the EAW as the first 
mutual recognition-based EU instrument), according to which the executing member 
state enjoys no discretion whatsoever to convert or adapt the sentence imposed by 
the issuing member state, at least two recent mutual recognition-based legal instru-
ments spell out that a person, following execution of a sentence or disqualification in 
another member state, may not be treated more unfavourably than if he or she had 
been imprisoned, respectively convicted by the national authorities of the member 
state executing the sentence or disqualification concerned.
The first example can be found in Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA 
of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to 
judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving 
deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union.43 
The text of Article 8, paragraphs 2-4, of the text reads as follows:
2. Where the sentence is incompatible with the law of the executing State in terms of 
its duration, the competent authority of the executing State may decide to adapt the 
sentence only where that sentence exceeds the maximum penalty provided for similar 
offences under its national law. The adapted sentence shall not be less than the maxi-
mum penalty provided for similar offences under the law of the executing State.
3. Where the sentence is incompatible with the law of the executing State in terms 
of its nature, the competent authority of the executing State may adapt it to the 
punishment or measure provided for under its own law for similar offences. Such a 
punishment or measure shall correspond as closely as possible to the sentence imposed 
in the issuing State and therefore the sentence shall not be converted into a pecuniary 
punishment.
4. The adapted sentence shall not aggravate the sentence passed in the issuing State 
in terms of its nature or duration.
However, as beneficial as the rationale of the proposed conversion and lex mitior rules 
may be, it is conceptually not compatible with the mutual recognition theory. As was 
pointed out, the European Commission – in the context of the EAW – explicitly recog-
nised the ban of all procedures intended for the conversion of a foreign sentence or 
measure. In addition, the Commission has now even included a proposal in the above 
framework decision to also impose the lex mitior rule upon member states when they 
choose to execute the sentence themselves in the context of applying the aut dedere, aut 
exequi principle referred to above.
42 European Commission, Brussels, 19 September 2001, COM (2001) 522 final, 2001/0215 (CNS), 20.
43 Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle 
of mutual recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures in-
volving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union.
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The second example was originally to be included in the proposed framework deci-
sion on taking account of convictions in the EU member states in the course of new 
criminal proceedings,44 in which the principle had been inserted that:
“if, under national legislation, convictions handed down in the other member states 
against nationals or residents are entered in the national criminal record, the rules 
governing entry in the record, modifications or deletion of the information entered 
may under no circumstances have the effect of causing the person to be treated more 
unfavourably than if he/she had been convicted by a national court.”
In the meantime, a political decision seems to have been reached that the matter 
concerned should be dealt with in the context of the negotiations on the proposal for 
a Council framework decision on the organisation and content of the exchange of 
information extracted from criminal records between member states, to which the 
phrase concerned would be copied.
In summary, there is a clear trend to return to the past – and to the lex mitior 
principle in particular as a core human rights characteristic of it – instead of further 
developing and enhancing the mutual recognition principle in accordance with the 
initial theoretical dogmas that marked it. At the same time, however, the observed 
trend marks a prominent resurrection of the domestic legal system (of the executing 
member state) as the point of reference, by which it could be argued that the essential 
mutual trust presumption on which the entire mutual recognition principle was built, 
has been substantially done away with.
It is clear that ‘mutual trust’ is “more of a stated intention than real trust that 
member states wish to carry through to its final consequences”.45 These developments 
strengthen the call for actions promoting mutual trust, which lies at the heart of the 
mutual recognition model. In this respect, EU action on procedural rights would have 
the potential of turning things back around. The only question is: what should this 
‘action’ look like?
4 From minimum approximation to mutual recognition of procedural 
rights
4.1 Minimum approximation of procedural rights at EU level
In order to create a true basis for genuine mutual trust between the member states, 
and a solid foundation for mutual recognition, a binding common base of procedural 
minimum standards is required. The proposal for a draft framework decision on cer-
tain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the EU was a first impor-
tant step taken by the Commission. There remains controversy however as to whether 
there was a legal basis for the EU to legislate in this area. The Council Legal Service in 
its opinion of 30 September 2004 on the subject concluded as follows:
44 See: Art 6, para 2 of the proposed Framework Decision, Council of the EU, COPEN 46, 8652/06, Brus-
sels, 16 May 2006.
45 M. De Hoyos Sancho, Harmonization of criminal proceedings, mutual recognition and essential safe-
guards, in M. De Hoyos Sancho (ed.), o.c., 42. 
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“Therefore, if the Council is of the opinion that the guarantees laid down in the 
proposal at Union level offer advantages because of the positive effect on mutual trust 
between member states and between courts and on the functioning of criminal justice 
systems, and that these measures do not go beyond what is necessary to improve judi-
cial cooperation, the Union may adopt the proposed measures and Article 31 (1) (c) 
of the TEU is the correct legal basis for that.”
The Council Legal Service, therein followed by the Commission, thus agrees that as 
long as the main focus remains upon judicial cooperation in criminal matters, article 
31 TEU can and should be interpreted broadly. This seems logical. Given the adop-
tion of other framework decisions, there is nothing to prevent the Union laying down 
standards insofar as the essential aim is to facilitate mutual recognition.46
As such, the draft framework decision was a good initiative. However, it was insuf-
ficient to create the foundation of confidence it is striving for, due to its limited scope 
and the significant exceptions incorporated into the proposal.47 Encompassing only 
the right to information, the right to legal assistance (including free legal assistance) 
and the right to interpretation and translation, made the proposal support a noble 
cause. However, building mutual trust between member states requires more than a 
minimum amount of approximation regarding the rights mentioned. Of deeper con-
cern are the exceptions that had been integrated into the preamble of the draft legal 
instrument, stating that the “proposed provisions are not intended to affect specific 
measures in force in national legislations in the context of the fight against certain 
serious and complex forms of crime in particular terrorism.”
Making such essential exceptions, specifically with regard to terrorism, leads to the 
belief that there is still no real acquis in respect of procedural safeguards.
The Commission announced in its Legislative and Work Programme for 2009 (“Acting 
now for a better Europe”)48 that it would propose a new draft Framework Decision on 
procedural rights in July 2009. As indicated earlier, the proposal published on 8 July 
2009 is very limited in scope, its (only) objectives being to improve interpretation and 
translation.
4.2 Approximation of procedural rights on a higher level
Due to their potentially exceptionally strong impact on the fundamental right to 
respect for private life, the field of (special) investigative measures – such as e.g. 
(house) search, infiltration, interception of telecommunications and having recourse 
to anonymous witness testimony and protection of and collaboration with witnesses 
– also requires a minimal level of approximation. In this respect, the steps to be taken 
towards approximation should at least incorporate the rich acquis of the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights, which has ruled in many cases involving 
investigative measures and the right to private life and which has a substantial impact 
on domestic criminal procedure.
46 This view was also expressed in a Paper that was submitted by Justice, Amnesty International EU Of-
fice and the Open Society Justice Initiative for the experts meeting on procedural rights organised by 
the Commission on 26 and 27 March 2009. 
47 Also see Ch. Brants, l.c., 110-116. 
48 COM(2008) 712 final. 
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In the field of house search for example, The ECHR provides the minimum stand-
ard for safeguards. These include the level of certainty that evidence is on the premises 
to be searched; the time of day when search powers can be used; notification of the 
person whose premises have been searched; the rules applicable when the occupier 
of premises is absent; and the need for independent third parties to be present at the 
search. Within this framework, significant national variations in the safeguards exist. 
In 2004, the Belgian Government was convicted in the Van Rossem case for having 
violated article 8 ECHR for using insufficiently detailed arrest warrants.49 The case 
led to a change of the national rules on house search by the Belgian Supreme Court. 
Overall compliance within member states with these minimum rules would thus not 
only offer a basic procedural protection of those targeted by the search warrant, but 
would also facilitate the admissibility of evidence gathered through a house search in 
a cross-border context.
As is clear from the previous example, the ECHR acquis should constitute the 
minimum level of any approximation effort on procedural rights at EU level. For some 
member states, however, a meaningful and worthwhile measure would mean a meas-
ure that would not only be consistent (in the sense of not conflicting) with the ECHR 
but which would also go beyond the ECHR and add real value for those involved in 
criminal investigations or proceedings within Europe.50
The mutual recognition principle should thus be combined with a legally guaran-
teed respect for procedural criminal law standards through a wider and more specific 
minimum approximation than envisaged in the draft framework decision on certain 
procedural rights, while still respecting the subsidiarity principle. This would serve a 
double cause. Firstly, subjects targeted in investigations with a cross-border dimension 
would be offered a higher degree of protection (at a minimum respecting the ECHR 
acquis). Secondly, judicial cooperation in the broadest sense (including the admissibil-
ity of evidence gathered abroad) through the mutual recognition principle would be 
facilitated, given the general focus on the ‘forum regit actum’ rule. Cooperation accord-
ing to this latter principle can only be successful if the requesting state’s (forum) legis-
lation or legal practice in respect of a certain investigative measure is not irreconcilable 
with the requested state’s (locus) fundamental principles of law. Such incompatibilities 
would considerably be avoided if those fundamental principles were approximated. 
Exceptions in this respect could be made for investigative techniques with a high sen-
sitivity such as controlled deliveries or Joint Investigation Teams (JIT).51
This conviction has inspired several preparatory legislative proposals, drafted by 
the Institute of International Research in Criminal Policy (IRCP). Two examples are 
elaborated below.52 The first relates to the aforementioned principle of availability.53 
49 ECHR, Van Rossem v. Belgium, 9.12.2004 (application no. 41872/98).
50 See in this respect the Report of the European Union Committee of the UK House of Lords, Procedural 
rights in EU criminal proceedings – an update, May 2009. 
51 The current mutual legal assistance regime concerning a JIT still refers to the traditional locus rule 
(article 3(b) of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002on joint investigation teams, OJ L 162, 
20.06.2002).
52 For this analysis, see earlier, G. Vermeulen, ‘Mutual recognition, harmonisation and fundamental 
(procedural) rights protection’, in M. Martin (ed.), Crime, rights and the EU: the future of police and 
judicial cooperation, JUSTICE, 2008, 89-104. 
53 G. Vermeulen, T. Vander Beken, L. Van Puyenbroeck and S. Van Malderen, Availability of law enforce-
ment information in the European Union. Between mutual recognition and equivalent right of access 
(Antwerp 2005) 110 pp.
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The other relates to (both procedural and non-procedural) witness protection and col-
laboration with justice.54
The November 2004 Hague Programme introduced the principle of availability as 
the future principle for the exchange of law enforcement cooperation. It entails that 
information needed for law enforcement purposes should cross the EU’s internal bor-
ders without any obstacles. In essence it calls for a free traffic of information relevant 
for law enforcement purposes. The principle of availability has the power to transform 
mutual recognition as it subsists today in its – by means of the requirements of access 
by equivalent authorities or Europol only – mitigated form into a stronger concept of 
genuine mutual recognition.
The IRCP proposal seeked to ensure that, by using a so-called pre-evidence warrant, 
member states would be able to exchange relevant information on available law enforce-
ment measures, provided that they comply with specific safeguards. Firstly, the proposed 
warrant would only concern existing information, ruling out the possibility of requiring 
investigatory measures for obtaining the information.55 Secondly, the information would 
only be used in the pre-evidence phase.56 Using the information as genuine evidence 
would mean that one would rely on traditional mutual legal assistance schemes in order 
to request and receive the information required. Thirdly, the pre-evidence warrant would 
ensure maximum traceability of the information: by systematic logging of the informa-
tion in the executing state as well as in the issuing state; by introducing a duty to list all 
information obtained using the pre-evidence warrant in the criminal file and actually 
adding to the file the information that has been used effectively, even if only as ‘steer-
ing’ information and not as genuine evidence in court. Compliance with the traceability 
duties would be subject to disciplinary, civil and/or criminal liability.57 Supplementary 
control would be provided by the introduction of the concept of ‘information DNA’, i.e., 
the complete historical trace to which a specific sample of information has been subject, 
that will be attached to the information, with a view to future access and use.
In the field of (both procedural and non-procedural) witness protection and collabo-
ration with justice, the current EU/multilateral acquis encompasses only a set of main-
stream ideas, non-binding best practices and soft law instruments. The three IRCP 
proposals on protected witnesses58, anonymous witnesses and collaborators with jus-
tice59 have made a genuine attempt to update and upgrade these concepts into binding 
EU minimum standards, with a clear view on approximation of criminal procedural 
54 G. Vermeulen (ed.), EU standards in witness protection and collaboration with justice (Antwerp 2005) 
280 pp.
55 G. Vermeulen, T. Vander Beken, L. Van Puyenbroeck and S. Van Malderen, o.c., p. 41.
56 Ibid., p. 26.
57 Ibid., pp. 44-46.
58 For a definition reference can be made to the Recommendation (2005) 9 of the Committee of Minis-
ters of the Council of Europe to Member States on the protection of witnesses and the collaborator of 
justice, where a ‘witness’ is defined as “any person who possesses information relevant to criminal pro-
ceedings about which he/she has given and/or is able to give testemony (irrespective of his/her status 
and of the direct or indirect, oral or written form of the testimony, in accordance with national law) who 
is not included in the definition of ‘collaborator of justice’.”
59 In the aforementioned Recommendation (2005) 9 a ‘collaborator of justice’ is defined as “any person 
who faces criminal charges, or was convicted, of having taken part in an association of criminals or 
other criminal organisation of any kind, or in organised crime offences but agrees to cooperate with 
criminal justice authorities, particularly by giving information about the criminal association or or-
ganisation or any criminal offecne connected with organised crime or other serious offences”. 
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law within the member states.60 The starting point used in the proposals is a maximum 
scope ratione materiae covering offences committed within the framework of a criminal 
organisation or participation in a criminal organisation,61 terrorist offences, offences 
relating to a terrorist group or offences relating to terrorist activities,62 offences within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and the rest of the 32 offences 
commonly used in mutual recognition instruments, provided that they are punishable 
by a sentence involving deprivation of liberty for at least three years.
The link to the list of 32 offences is supplemented by an opt-out clause for member 
states implementing legal concepts in their domestic legal order – thereby ensur-
ing respect for the subsidiarity principle – with the exception of offences committed 
within the framework of a criminal organisation or participation in a criminal organi-
sation.63
An important feature incorporated into the proposals is the obligation for member 
states to accept evidence gathered in another member state which makes use of pro-
tected witnesses or collaborators with justice, even where such use is related to offences 
which this member state has excluded from the domestic scope of the legal concepts 
concerned by use of the opt-out clause. However, the value of the evidence gathered in 
this way is different in each of the three proposals. In the case of anonymous witnesses, 
information provided by them in accordance with the proposed procedural guarantees 
should be accepted in another member state as supportive evidence, even where the 
information relates to one of the opt-out offences in the latter. When information has 
been obtained from a collaborator with justice, provided that the procedural guaran-
tees introduced in the proposal have been complied with, it is proposed that member 
states accept such information at least as supportive evidence, but allows them to 
accept it as core evidence if they so wish. In the case of a protected witness providing 
information in accordance with the procedural rules and guarantees embedded in the 
proposal, full recognition of the information as evidence is required. 64
A second important innovation of the proposals relates to decisions not to pros-
ecute (res iudicata) collaborators with justice. The ne bis in idem effect65 that is created 
by these decisions should be respected, regardless of the use of the opt-out clause 
by the member state for (certain of) the non-mandatory offences. This means that, 
according to the proposal, a collaborator with justice who has been granted immunity 
from prosecution in accordance with the proposal in one member state, may not be 
prosecuted by another member state for the offences for which he or she has been 
granted immunity from prosecution. This is the case even where the latter member 
state has chosen not to provide in its legislation for the possibility that the competent 
authority may grant immunity from prosecution, provided that the decision whereby 
immunity was granted bars further prosecution in the member state where the immu-
nity was granted.
60 G. Vermeulen (ed.), o.c., 280 pp.
61 As defined by the Framework Decision on the fight against organised crime (Council of the EU, CRI-
MORG 132 OC 597, 12279/06, Brussels, 28 September 2006).
62 As defined by the Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ L 164 of 22.6. 
2002.
63 G. Vermeulen (ed.), o.c., p. 240.
64 Ibid., p. 241.
65 See Court of Justice, 11 February 2003 (Gözütok and Brügge), C-187/01 and C-385/01.
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By integrating the two aforementioned characteristics, a minimum mandatory 
mutual recognition is assured. In order to enhance this minimum mutual recognition, 
specific minimum criminal procedural law guarantees have been similarly included in 
all three proposals. These encompass guarantees regarding the competent authorities, 
the granting and revoking of the status of anonymous or protected witnesses and col-
laborators with justice,66 the evidential value of evidence gathered using anonymous 
or protected witnesses or collaborators with justice,67 the rights of the defence68 and 
written agreement including the rights and duties in granting or revoking protection 
or benefits. Specifically, the principles of necessity and subsidiarity are recognised 
by opting for a well structured procedure verifying the need to rely on anonymous 
or protected witnesses or collaborators with justice. The rationale is logically related 
to the reliability of the individuals involved, the rights of the defence to challenge or 
question the witness, the costs involved and possible ethical issues that can rise as a 
result of using one of these possibilities.
The proposals, therefore, highlight the need for an approximation of minimum 
procedural rules. Complemented with a clear and comprehensive outline of minimum 
guarantees offered by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
proposals are believed to form a wide-ranging and effective instrument in strengthen-
ing the mutual recognition principle.
4.3 Towards genuine mutual recognition of procedural guarantees
The previously discussed options all imply establishing a binding minimum level of 
domestic procedural criminal law standards. These should be developed around the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, thus providing a solid base for mutual recognition. As 
explained above, this approximation effort should be done at a wider and more specific 
level than the current proposal for a framework decision on procedural rights. Another 
and final option concerns the question what should be done if, in respect of a certain 
investigative tool or method, the domestic procedural law of the requested state offers 
a higher standard than the requesting state (or vice versa). Should the lowest common 
denominator be applied? Or should the individual concerned be accorded the highest 
standard of protection?
In such cases, it should be considered to combine the option of approximation 
with a mutual recognition of domestic procedural criminal law standards which go beyond 
the binding minimum level. This combination of the safeguards of the member states’ 
criminal justice systems would maximise procedural protection for suspects and 
defendants and would consequently enhance mutual trust between member states, 
facilitating the application of mutual recognition instruments.
An example of this idea can already be found in the EU acquis. Article 10 of the 
2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance provides the legal framework for hearing a 
66 Evidently, the specific conditions to grant or revoke the status differs in each proposal regarding re-
spectively anonymous or protected witnesses or collaborators with justice. See G. Vermeulen (ed.), o.c., 
p. 247, p. 254 and pp. 261-262.
67 Evidently, the specific rules on the value of evidence gathered, differs in each proposal regarding re-
spectively anonymous or protected witnesses or collaborators with justice. The relevant jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights was duly taken into account. See Ibid., p. 241.
68 The relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights was duly taken into account. See 
Ibid., p. 241.
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witness or expert by videoconference. With respect to the applicable rules, article 10 (5) 
(e) states that “the person to be heard may claim the right not to testify which would accrue 
to him under the law of either the requested or the requesting member state”. In other words, 
this article applies the ‘lex mitior’ principle concerning the rights of excuse regarding 
hearing by videoconference. This rule should be generalised at EU level by officially 
incorporating it into mutual recognition.
5 Conclusion
The underlying research question of this article basically deals with a comparison of 
the possible options to take legal action at EU level in order to provide suspects and 
defendants within the EU with a better procedural protection. At present measures 
in this regard at EU level are primarily concerned with the introduction of common 
minimum standards (cf. the proposal for a framework decision on procedural rights). 
It should be considered not only to continue these approximation efforts at a wider 
and more specific scale (meaning the adoption of rights that go beyond the minimum 
level and which take account of the specific characteristics of intrusive investigative 
measures such as house search or interception of telecommunications) but also to 
introduce a mutual recognition of domestic procedural safeguards. Through a profound 
legal analysis the authors see these options as a necessary counterbalance for the free 
movement of evidence within the EU that is currently being envisaged at EU level.
Guaranteeing an acceptable level of procedural protection to suspects and defend-
ants throughout the EU by approximation of national legislations is, of course, not the 
only possibly effective measure to strengthen mutual trust within the EU’s common 
judicial area. Legal action on procedural rights at EU level should be combined with 
a wide range of actions: “from the simplest – training of legal agents, learning of 
foreign languages – to the administrative – creation of networks, establishment of 
liaison magistrates or contact points – to the most complex such as improvements in 
the inherent quality of national regulations and effective compliance with the judge-
ments of the ECtHR...”.69
Nevertheless, a combination of mutually recognised domestic procedural safe-
guards with a wide approximation of procedural rights would be an ideal solution, 
both in terms of enhancing judicial cooperation by strengthening mutual trust as 
of presenting suspects and defendants with an adequate level of procedural protec-
tion. Requests for legal assistance would be executed more easily, for the competent 
authorities within member states would be assured that their foreign counterparts are 
bound by the same minimum procedural rules. On top of that, mutually recognising 
domestic procedural safeguards that go beyond the binding minimum level would 
considerably strengthen the legal position of the persons concerned by offering them 
the best of two worlds according to the lex mitior principle. This would not be revolu-
tionary since the EU acquis on mutual legal assistance already provides this (cf. article 
10 of the 2000 EU Convention on mutual assistance on the hearing by videoconfer-
ence). A generalisation of this rule would be an important step towards practical and 
69 M. De Hoyos Sancho, l.c., 46. 
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effective procedural protection of suspects and defendants throughout the EU and 
would thus contribute to a stronger area of freedom, security and justice.
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